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The Fiscal Compact, which was signed by 25 of the EU’s member states in 2012, foresaw the creation of
an inter-parliamentary conference to enable national parliaments to discuss major issues of
economic and financial governance. The third meeting of this ‘Inter-parliamentary Conference for
Economic and Financial Governance’ will be held on 29 and 30 September. Valentin Kreilinger
writes that diverging views on the internal organisation of the conference have so far prevented it
from meeting the aims originally envisaged in the Fiscal Compact Treaty.
Inter-parliamentary cooperation and scrutiny could compensate national parliaments for the transfer
of power from the national to the European level and for the transfer of power from national
parliaments to their governments with respect to fiscal and economic policy. It could also allow the European
Parliament to exert influence in an area with little legislative activity and therefore an only marginal role for the
European Parliament. In this Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Economic and Financial Governance both
parliamentary levels could work together against their declining influence and exert countervailing power. The
purpose of inter-parliamentary cooperation should be to ‘discuss’ matters of common interest and to ‘control’ in areas
with weak parliamentary scrutiny, but not ‘decide’, because assigning decision-making power would significantly
alter the inter-institutional equilibrium.
The need for better cooperation between national parliaments and the European Parliament with respect to the
EMU was recognised in the Fiscal Compact treaty (TSCG) which was signed in March 2012:
‘As provided for in Title II of Protocol (No 1) on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union
annexed to the European Union Treaties, the European Parliament and the national Parliaments of
the Contracting Parties will together determine the organisation and promotion of a conference of
representatives of the relevant committees of the European Parliament and representatives of the
relevant committees of national Parliaments in order to discuss budgetary policies and other issues
covered by this Treaty.’ (Article 13 TSCG)
On the one hand, the European Parliament has traditionally been sceptical about enhancing the role of national
parliaments, fearing that this might undermine its position. In an own-initiative report on a genuine EMU, the
European Parliament stated in November 2012 that only itself, ‘as parliamentary body at the Union level for a
reinforced and democratic EMU governance’, had full democratic legitimacy to exercise control in that area, and
described the possibility of creating a mixed parliamentary body as ‘both ineffective and illegitimate’.
On the other hand, national parliaments have consciously adopted their positions towards inter-parliamentary
cooperation; their preferences for the precise organisation of this kind of inter-parliamentary cooperation differ and
the attitudes of national parliaments towards inter-parliamentary cooperation can be classified into three different
roles: (1) inward-looking parliaments that rarely engage beyond the minimum requirements; (2) passively
cooperative parliaments that participate in additional activities aimed at discussing inter-parliamentary cooperation;
and (3) actively networking parliaments that try to build coalitions in order to bring inter-parliamentary cooperation
forward. During the negotiations on the inter-parliamentary conference for Economic and Financial Governance, the
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Danish, French, German and Lithuanian Parliaments have been important players and adopted strong and visible
positions.
The Danish parliament organised two meetings of chairpersons of European affairs committees. In March 2013
chairpersons from 15 member states declared their preference for ‘establishing a small effective conference
focused on substantial issues – to be held in the margins of the biannual COSAC-meetings’. In the discussions
around the inter-parliamentary conference of Article 13 TSCG, the French National Assembly was in favour of
quickly establishing an inter-parliamentary conference and proposed to follow the model for CFSP and CSDP with 6
MPs per national parliament and 16 MEPs that would accompany and control the European Semester.
This idea was endorsed by the Speakers of Parliaments of the six founding member states in January 2013. Only at
a very late stage, in the run-up to the first meeting of the conference in Vilnius in October 2013, the German position
was made clear: It would be ‘premature’ to seek the adoption Rules of Procedure at that point, but the delegation
welcomed the idea to discuss the aims and functions of the conference. The Bundestag has insisted on limiting the
conference to being an advisory body. Although the time for preparing the first conference was limited, the
Lithuanian parliament had drafted Rules of Procedure, but the Bundestag and the European Parliament succeeded
in exerting pressure on the Lithuanian parliament to remove the item from the agenda of the conference.
These brief examples provide some evidence that the Danish Folketing was actively networking, but might not
always be able and willing to pursue this strategy and more often act passively cooperative; that the German
Bundestag was inward-looking, but turned into a passively cooperative parliament; that the French Assemblée
nationale was actively networking; and, finally, that the Lithuanian Seimas took its Presidency seriously and was
actively networking during that period of time. The resources that are available in a national parliament probably
determine the extent of its inter-parliamentary activities. Besides that, the motivation of individual MPs to participate
is a factor that also plays an important role.
At the moment, the Inter-parliamentary Conference of Article 13 TSCG meets on the basis of the conclusions of the
Speakers’ Conference that took place in Nicosia in April 2013 and remains a missed opportunity to agree on
something more ambitious: Each parliament can determine the size and composition of its delegation. The
conference takes place twice a year (with the Presidency shared between the European Parliament and the
parliament of the member state holding the rotating Council Presidency in the first semester and the ‘Presidency
parliament’ of the second semester presiding the conference on its own).
In the first semester of 2014 the Greek Parliament had asked the other parliaments for their views on the internal
organisation of the conference. Now the Italian parliament holds the presidency, facing the challenge of reconciling
the different positions. It has scheduled time to have a debate about the Rules of Procedure, but it remains to be
seen whether Rules of Procedure following the model of COSAC (Conference of Parliamentary Committees for
Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union) or the Inter-parliamentary conference on CFSP/CSDP will be
adopted. In the continuum between conflict and cooperation, the result of the conference will be a test-case in
determining whether national parliaments and the European Parliament can move from a period of prevailing
conflict to a more cooperative relationship.
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